High Court discharges worldwide freezing order for lack of jurisdiction

The High Court has discharged a worldwide freezing order (WFO) granted against respondents in Spain on the basis that it did not have jurisdiction over them. Despite finding that the claimants had a good claim in principle to Chabra relief against the respondents, the court held that none of the service out gateways relied on applied: Gilbert v Broadoak Private Finance Ltd [2026] EWHC 153 (KB).

The Chabra jurisdiction, established in the case of TSB Bank v Chabra [1992] 1 WLR 231, may be exercised where there is good reason to suppose that assets held in the name of a third party would be available to satisfy a judgment against the defendant – typically (though not exclusively) where those assets are beneficially owned by the defendant. 

Where respondents to an application for Chabra relief are outside the jurisdiction, a claimant will need the court's permission to serve the application on them. To obtain permission, the claimant will need to show that: (i) the application has a reasonable prospect of success; (ii) the application satisfies at least one of the jurisdictional gateways in CPR PD 6B, paragraph 3.1; and (iii) England and Wales is the proper place to bring the application (the forum conveniens).

As this case demonstrates, claimants may face difficulties in obtaining Chabra relief against respondents outside the jurisdiction where the claim between the claimant and main (or "anchor") defendant has concluded and a final judgment has been entered, so that the "necessary or proper party" gateway cannot be relied on. The court noted that there appear to be no cases where the court has granted permission to serve an application for Chabra relief out of the jurisdiction by reference to any other gateway.

The court recognised that it may seem harsh that the claimants had no route to establish jurisdiction where they had a good claim in principle. It commented, however, citing Commercial Bank of Dubai v Al Sari [2024] EWHC 3304 (Comm): "if there is to be a general power to serve proceedings out of the jurisdiction to assist the enforcement of an English judgment debt, that is a matter for the Rules Committee".

The decision further illustrates the importance of the duty of fair presentation and the duty of full and frank disclosure when making without notice applications. Applicants should ensure they undertake proper enquiries and investigate both the facts and legal arguments relied on before making an application. 

Background

The claimants made several loans to the defendant (Broadoak) to fund its business activities. Broadoak failed to repay the balance of the debt when it fell due and the claimants obtained judgment in their favour, of which around £4.2 million remains outstanding.

Before obtaining judgment, the claimants had obtained WFOs against Broadoak and its majority shareholder and principal director, Mr Bleakley. Following investigations into Broadoak's finances, it became apparent that large sums had been paid out to or for the benefit of Mrs Bleakley, Mr Bleakley's estranged wife, and King Street Capital SL (KSC), a Spanish company connected to Mr and Mrs Bleakley.

Following judgment, therefore, the claimants applied without notice for a WFO against Mrs Bleakley and KSC (together, the Respondents) pursuant to the Chabra jurisdiction. Despite the exceptional nature of this jurisdiction, the High Court was satisfied that Chabra relief was appropriate. It granted the WFO over all the assets of both Respondents up to a limit of £3.9 million and gave permission for service in Spain and by alternative means. 

At the return date, the Respondents argued that the WFO should be discharged on the ground that the claimants had breached their duties of fair presentation and full and frank disclosure. The Respondents also applied for a declaration that the English court did not have or should not have exercised jurisdiction over them.

Decision

The High Court (David Quest KC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) discharged the WFO. 

Personal jurisdiction

The court held that none of the service out gateways relied on applied in this case:

1. Gateway (2) applies where "a claim is made for an injunction ordering the defendant to do or refrain from doing an act within the jurisdiction". The claimants argued that this gateway applied as Mrs Bleakley had assets in the jurisdiction caught by the WFO, namely a bank account at HSBC with a balance of around £5,000. The court held that gateway (2) does not apply to freezing injunctions, applying the Supreme Court's decision in Siskina v Distos Cia Naviera SA [1979] AC 210 (concerning the predecessor to gateway (2)) which held that the term "injunction" refers only to an injunction sought as final, substantive relief and so not to freezing or other interim injunctions. 
2. Gateway (3) applies where a claim form has been or will be served on a defendant, that claim raises a real issue to be tried, and the claimant wishes to serve the claim form on another person who is a "necessary or proper party" to that claim. The claimants relied on a new claim that they had issued against Broadoak, Mr Bleakley and the Respondents, which they argued dealt with many issues that were common to all parties. The court held that this new claim was not sufficient to engage the gateway. Final judgment had already been entered against Broadoak in the original proceedings and no pending issues remained to be tried as between the claimants and Broadoak. For gateway (3) to apply, there must "actually be a common issue to be investigated as against the anchor defendant and the [third party] … the mere possibility that such an issue might arise at some point cannot be sufficient" (Commercial Bank of Dubai v Al Sari [2024] EWHC 3304 (Comm)). 
3. Gateway (10) applies where "a claim is made to enforce any judgment". The court held that this gateway did not apply, referring to Linsen International Ltd v Humpuss Sea Transport Pte Ltd [2011] EWHC 2339 (Comm) which held the gateway is not available for an application for Chabra relief because it is not a claim to enforce any judgment but only ancillary relief to assist in enforcement. The court also noted that there are two conflicting Court of Appeal decisions on whether gateway (10) is limited to enforcement against assets in this jurisdiction of a defendant who is out of the jurisdiction, but said it did not need to resolve that controversy in the present case.
4. Gateway (11) applies where "the subject matter of the claim relates wholly or principally to property within the jurisdiction". The claimants argued that the subject matter of their application related wholly and principally to the judgment debt, which, as an English judgment against an English company, was property within the jurisdiction. The court accepted that there was a connection between the WFO application and the judgment debt, but absent authority (and none was cited) felt unable to treat an application for Chabra relief as one whose subject matter related "wholly or principally" to the judgment debt. The court noted that the application was more directly concerned with the assets held by the Respondents, specifically whether they were available to the defendant and whether there was a risk of their dissipation. 
5. Gateway (20) applies where "a claim is made under an enactment which allows proceedings to be brought and those proceedings are not covered by any of the other [gateways]". Relying on Gorbachev v Guriev [2023] EWCA Civ 327 (in which the Court of Appeal held that a claim for third party disclosure under s.34 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 could be served out using this gateway), the claimants argued that their application was a claim made under s.37 of the Senior Court Acts 1981, which provides the court with the power to grant an injunction if it is just and convenient to do so, and that s.37 is an enactment that "allows proceedings to be brought". The court did not accept that s.37 is an enactment which "allows" proceedings to be brought. As a matter of statutory interpretation, the court held that this means "an enactment which establishes the procedural right to bring proceedings". The mere fact that a claim or application may be connected with or dependent in some way on an enactment is not enough. As to s.37, the court commented that it is concerned with remedies – it empowers the court to grant injunctive remedies in proceedings properly brought – but does not itself establish a right to bring proceedings. The court further commented on the "surprising consequences" that would flow if the claimants' position was right, including that the territorial limit embodied in gateway (2), which applies to domestic injunctions, would be redundant if a claim for a non-domestic injunction could anyway pass through gateway (20). 

Fair presentation

The Respondents also argued that the WFO should be discharged because the claimants had breached their duties at a without notice hearing to make a fair presentation of their application and to give full and frank disclosure. 

The principles relating to fair presentation of without notice applications were set out in Tugushev v Orlov [2019] EWHC 2031 (Comm), which stated that the duty requires the applicant to make proper enquiries before making its application, and to investigate both the facts and legal arguments relied on. Further, the duty to disclose extends to matters of which the applicant would have been aware had reasonable enquiries been made.

The Respondents argued that the claimants had not adequately explained the difficult and controversial questions of law raised by the jurisdictional gateway issue. The claimants had failed to cite any of the cases or legal texts discussing the application of the gateways, including material that favoured the Respondents. The court agreed and held that the claimants had not fairly presented this issue. The court also found that there had been minor breaches concerning other aspects of the application.

The court concluded, however, that the breaches were not sufficient in themselves to justify discharging the WFO. The breaches had not been deliberate, the claimants had indicated the gateway issue might be controversial and identified some of the arguments, and there was a good arguable case on the substance of the application. Had jurisdiction been made out, therefore, the court would not have discharged the WFO on this ground.

Note: This decision is subject to an appeal to the Court of Appeal.