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Data breach, Cyber security, UK, Enforcement, Data protection, Regulatory Authorities
On 15 October the Information Commissioner's Office ("ICO") in the UK issued a penalty notice decision, fining two companies within the Capita Group a total of £14 million for breaches of UK GDPR (£8 million for the parent, Capita plc, as data controller and £6 million for a subsidiary, Capita Pension Services Limited "CPSL", as data processor).
This fine ranks as one of the most substantial levied by the ICO to date in respect of cyber breaches (after appeals are taken into account), below the c.£20 million ultimately levied against British Airways, but well above the average level of fine for UK GDPR breaches. In fact, the final figure represents a discount from the ICO's starting point of a combined £58 million fine. Capita settled with the ICO to reduce the penalty by admitting breaches of the UK GDPR and agreeing not to appeal the decision, along with a discount applied to reflect the fact that these were two group companies and to avoid suggestions of "double punishment".
This decision highlights the serious regulatory consequences of cyber security failures, offers an insight into the ICO's expectations and approach, and acts as a timely reminder of the importance of proactive cyber resilience and effective governance.
The ICO's decision concerns a cyber attack in March 2023 which compromised Capita's IT estate and exposed the personal data of over six million individuals, including sensitive personal data containing criminal records, financial details and special category data. The Capita entities held a "very large amount of personal data", both as data controllers and processors, in their roles as part of a business process outsourcing and professional services group. In particular, CPSL acted as data processor for over 600 pension schemes, and the incident impacted over 300 such organisations.
The ICO identified several failings which it said amounted to breaches of UK GDPR and in particular its duties to use and implement appropriate technical and organisational measures under Articles 5(1)(f) and 32. Specifically, these include failures to:
The ICO also outlined the measures that it considered Capita should have implemented to remedy these technical and organisational failings. This serves as a useful reminder of how regulators view minimum security standards. For instance, to prevent privilege escalation and unauthorised lateral movement across its IT estate, the ICO said Capita should have had privileged access management ("PAM") and account tiering in place, in accordance with the principle of least privilege (where accounts and users have the minimum access needed to perform their role). PAM involves privileged account management and control, often including features like multi-factor authentication, "just-in-time" access, credential vaulting and session monitoring. In addition, Capita should have conducted more widespread penetration testing to identify and remedy vulnerabilities before the incident. The ICO will "expect a mature Information Security Management System to have a well-established and comprehensive penetration testing program". Notably, the Commissioner considered that "vulnerability scans do not replace the need for penetration testing but both may contribute to a mature vulnerability management programme". However, the ICO's decision does acknowledge that some high risk systems may be out of scope for penetration testing.
As noted the ICO was particularly scathing where vulnerabilities persisted after Capita became aware of them, stating that this suggested that Capita "had decided to accept the risk". This highlights a difficulty for organisations who are seeking to balance security programmes with budget restraints. Regulators are likely to take a dim view of any indication that risks were tolerated rather than addressed, and challenging such findings made with the benefit of hindsight is difficult to do.
In identifying infringements and remedial measures, the ICO referred to several industry standards and frameworks, including National Cyber Security Centre ("NCSC") guidance, the Centre for Internal Security ("CIS") Critical Security Controls ("CIS Controls"), and Implementation Group 3 ("IG3"); ISO 27001; the National Institute for Standards in Technology Cybersecurity Framework ("NIST CIF"); and MITRE ATT&CK framework. The ICO also assessed the group against its own internal security alert response targets, rejecting Capita's argument that such considerations were irrelevant as they did not describe regulatory or contractual obligations. This provides a helpful indication of how the ICO will evaluate the appropriateness of technical and organisational measures, the number of sources it will consider and, by extension, the standards which data controllers and processors should benchmark their performance against. It also again indicates the difficulty organisations have if they fail to follow their own policies, as it is difficult to argue that these do not describe known risks which should have been averted.
As well as assessing the "state of the art" for regulatory purposes, the ICO also considered the other factors provided for in Article 32 UK GDPR, including the costs of implementing remedies, the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing and the likelihood and severity of risks to individuals. It found that the potential for harm to impacted data subjects as a result of the Capita cyber incident "could persist indefinitely" and that while the breaches were not deliberate, Capita's awareness of some of the issues aggravated the breaches which occurred.
The ICO fined Capita a total £14 million for the breaches of UK GDPR identified above, split between Capita plc (£8 million) and CPSL (£6 million). This represented a £44 million reduction on the initial starting point of £58 million, in part as a result of a settlement agreement under which Capita admitted breaches of the UK GDPR and agreed not to appeal the decision. As well as settlement, the following factors were relevant to determining the final level of the fine:
The ICO also dismissed a number of legal arguments challenging the applicability of the fining regime in the UK GDPR, including an attempt to argue that the current Data Protection Fining Guidance, published in March 2024, was a penal regime which engaged the European Convention on Human Rights and was not sufficiently legally certain. The Commissioner confirmed that the fining regime "is sufficiently certain, precise and foreseeable and the penalty has a clear and unambiguous basis in the DPA and UK GDPR".
Capita also argued that separately fining two companies within the same group was disproportionate and amounted to "double punishment". This was dismissed by the ICO as an argument not to fine both companies. Both Capita entities owed their own obligations as a data controller and processor respectively, and each independently breached those obligations. However, the ICO did take this into account in reducing its initial fine calculation from £58 million to just over £20 million, before the further discount due to Capita settling. In a positive outcome for large groups with complex corporate structures, the ICO also indicated that where infringements arise from the same set of security measures, it may not be effective or proportionate to take action against more than one data controller or processor in a group.
Partner, Intellectual Property and Head of Cyber Security and Data, London
Partner, London
Partner, London
Partner, Intellectual Property and Head of Cyber Security and Data, London
Partner, London
Partner, London
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