High Court dismisses claim against Uber by 13,000 black cab drivers on limitation grounds

In a judgment handed down on 19 October 2026, the High Court dismissed a claim pursued by approximately 13,000 claimants on the basis that their claims were time-barred – see White and others / Peters v Uber London Ltd [2026] EWHC 2651 (Comm). 

The court dismissed the claims in their entirety, finding that the claimants could with reasonable diligence have discovered the alleged fraud and/or deliberate concealment on which their claims were based earlier than they asserted.

Time starts to run for limitation purposes when the cause of action accrued – which, in a tort claim, is when damage was suffered – or in a case of fraud or deliberate concealment, when the fraud or concealment could, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered. It is not postponed while the claimant takes legal advice on the prospects of a claim or conducts further analysis. 

The ruling demonstrates the importance of carefully considering when limitation begins to run, not by reference to when lawyers are in fact instructed or are able to advise that there is a worthwhile claim, but when sufficient information is available to the claimant(s). More specifically, this ruling suggests that where a case draws on a decision by a regulator or other third party, when the regulator’s view became public or otherwise known to the claimants is likely to be of central importance. 

A HSF Kramer team led by Rachel Lidgate and Alan Watts, assisted by David Shepherd, Louisa Cranfield, Jennifer O'Brien and Eleanor Dunning, are acting for Uber in relation to this matter.

Background

The claimants are around 13,000 black cab drivers and an individual as assignee of the claims of two now liquidated minicab businesses (Justin Peters), who claimed for loss of earnings arising from unlawful means conspiracy they alleged had been committed by the defendants. Mishcon de Reya are the solicitors for the claimants. The defendants are three entities within the Uber group.

The claim originated in July 2019 when a pre-action letter was sent to the defendants on behalf of the black cab driver claimants, to which HSF Kramer responded on behalf of the defendants in October 2019. The claimants’ litigation funder Harbour stepped back in November 2019, and the claim went silent for several years, until the claim forms were issued in May 2024. Uber proposed that the question of whether the claims were time-barred pursuant to the Limitation Act 1980 would need to be determined before the substantive pleaded issues were tried. The claimants agreed to this proposal, and, in October 2025, the court ordered the trial of the preliminary issue in the terms agreed by the parties. 

The defendants were successful in bringing an application for disclosure against the claimants in June 2026, whereby the defendants sought correspondence between Mishcon, Harbour, and the Licensed Taxi Drivers Association ("LTDA") (a black cab drivers’ trade association). The defendants contended that the documents sought could demonstrate that it was possible for the claimants to embark upon the preliminaries to litigation earlier than they did (thereby undermining their position in the preliminary issue trial). Further details can be found in our blog post on that decision here.

A preliminary issue trial took place from 29 June to 6 July 2026 on the question of whether the claimants discovered, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered, Uber’s alleged wrongdoing only after late June 2018 (ie within six years of the claim forms being issued, so that the claims were within the limitation period for tort claims). As is typical for the trial of a preliminary issue, the trial proceeded on the basis of a set of agreed assumptions, namely that the allegations made by the claimants against Uber were true. 

The claimants argued that information came to light at a hearing on 25-26 June 2018 with regard to whether Uber should be re-licensed to operate in London, without which they would not have been able to bring their claim for unlawful means conspiracy. The defendants disagreed, contending that there was sufficient information in the public sphere, or otherwise available to the claimants, to have allowed them to bring a claim before the June 2018 hearing, and that the claims were therefore time-barred. 

Decision

The High Court (Birt J) ruled in Uber’s favour, finding that the claimants could have discovered the alleged fraud and/or deliberate concealment upon which their claim was based earlier than 25 or 26 June 2018, and therefore more than six years before the first of the claim forms was issued. The claims are therefore time-barred and have been dismissed in their entirety. 

Applicable legal principles 

The claimants relied on s.32 of the Limitation Act 1980 to plead their case. Pursuant to s.32(1)(a) and s.32(1)(b), time will not begin to run unless the claimant has either discovered (actual knowledge) or could with reasonable diligence have discovered (constructive knowledge) the alleged fraud or deliberate concealment on which the claim is based. 

As to the requisite level of knowledge required to bring a claim under s.32, the court agreed that, for the purpose of this preliminary issue trial, two different tests were required:

1. Section 32(1)(a) – the “statement of claim test”: whether the claimant had, or with reasonable diligence could have obtained, knowledge to enable them to properly plead a claim that would not be liable to be struck out. 
2. Section 32(1)(b) – the “worthwhile claim test”: time should begin to run from the time at which the claimant knows, or could with reasonable diligence have known, that it has a worthwhile claim so as to justify embarking on the preliminaries required to issue proceedings, such as submitting a claim, taking legal advice, or collecting evidence. 

Further, the start of the limitation period cannot be postponed by the need to consider the prospects of whether a claim will be successful, or to seek legal advice on the same.

Unlawful means conspiracy 

The cause of action pleaded by the claimants was unlawful means conspiracy. The unlawful means allegedly committed by Uber and pleaded by the claimants fell broadly into the following three categories:

1. Misrepresentations to TfL as to Uber’s booking flow and operating systems;
2. Failure to disclose material information to TfL as to the use of Greyball and Ripley “kill switch” technology; and
3. Intentional and unlawful operation of private hire transport services across London. 

Whether the defendants had committed unlawful means conspiracy was not determined as part of the preliminary issue trial, since the judge was only required to determine the question of whether the claims were time-barred. 

Constructive knowledge 

Disclosure was provided for the purpose of the preliminary issue by a group of 20 sample claimants, made up of 10 claimants each selected by the claimants and defendants, as well as Mr Peters. Material available in the public domain also formed part of disclosure, including numerous social media posts disclosed by the defendants, trade magazines, and media articles. Much of the material indicated that black cab drivers were concerned by Uber’s entry into the London market and made assertions that they were operating in contravention of TfL regulations and legislation. 

One of the key documents in determining limitation was a document referred to as the TfL Decision Letter. This was a confidential letter sent to Uber by TfL on 22 September 2017, the day that TfL declined to renew Uber’s London operator’s licence, setting out in detail why Uber’s licence had not been renewed and contending, amongst other points, that Uber had misled TfL when seeking to obtain an operator’s licence. It was made public by the LTDA on their website on 20 December 2017, following the provision of the letter on a confidential basis pursuant to the LTDA’s successful application to participate in Uber’s claim against TfL to have its operator’s licence renewed. 

The claimants, however, asserted that there was not sufficient evidence in the public sphere to allow them to pursue a claim against Uber prior to the licensing appeal. In particular, they could not have made a claim against Uber before having had sight of the witness statements provided by Helen Chapman (TfL) and Thomas Elvidge (Uber), which were made public as a result of Uber’s licensing appeal and the June 2018 hearing. 

Having considered the material disclosed by both the claimants and defendants, Birt J found that the claimants could with reasonable diligence have discovered sufficient information so as to plead their case, and that they could have done so based on the information available up to and including the publication of the TfL Decision Letter in December 2017.

Actual knowledge 

As to witness evidence, the claimants only put forward evidence from three claimants, despite each of the 20 sample claimants having had the opportunity to put in a statement and no explanation being provided for why they did not. Birt J declined to determine the state of knowledge of any of the other claimants based on the actual knowledge of the three claimants who did give evidence. 

The claimants had suggested that, following disclosure from the sample claimants, the burden was on the defendants to identify any documents which indicated that any of the other sample claimants had relevant knowledge. In the absence of any such documents, the judge should find that the sample claimants did not have relevant knowledge of the defendants’ alleged conduct for the purpose of making a claim. Birt J disagreed with this approach, as each of the sample claimants had been given the opportunity to give evidence on their level of knowledge, and it could not have been intended that a smaller group of claimants selected from an already defined group would have their level of knowledge applied more widely. 

In any event, the court found that the claimants' disclosure demonstrated that two of the three claimant witnesses had actual knowledge as to the defendants alleged unlawful conduct, and that the remaining witness was disinterested at the time in whether there might be a claim.