SFO sets out plans for more proactive enforcement: key takeaways for companies

Key points

• The SFO is seeking to drive increased self-reporting by offering greater certainty on access to Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs).
• The agency is investing in intelligence capabilities and signalling a more proactive enforcement model.
• Expanded powers under the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act (ECCTA) materially enhance the SFO’s pre-investigation toolkit.
• International co-operation remains central to the SFO’s strategy.

Corporate co-operation and DPAs

In his recent speech, Mr McNulty emphasised that he wants the SFO to receive more self-reports, which he expects will lead to greater use of DPAs. The SFO’s revised corporate co-operation guidance - published in April 2025 and discussed in our earlier post - provides that, where a corporate self-reports promptly and co-operates fully, the SFO will invite it to negotiate a DPA rather than prosecute, unless exceptional circumstances apply.

The guidance also includes specific process commitments. Where a corporate self-reports promptly and co-operates fully, the SFO will:

• make contact within 48 business hours of a self-report;
• provide regular updates throughout the process;
• decide within six months whether to open a formal investigation; and
• conclude DPA negotiations within six months of sending an invite.

Mr McNulty described this as “the strongest possible offer to responsible corporates” and emphasised that the threshold for self-reporting remains deliberately low: a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing suffices.

The speech also illustrated the consequences of incomplete co-operation through the Ultra Electronics DPA emphasising that “The SFO will walk away from negotiations and pursue a prosecution unless a company genuinely co-operates.” As highlighted in our recent briefing, when Ultra failed to disclose relevant information about conduct in Oman during advanced negotiations, the SFO withdrew from discussions and expanded the scope of its investigation. Negotiations resumed only after the company ultimately disclosed the relevant information, following significant changes to its ownership, structure and leadership.

The SFO measures are intended to make self-reporting a more attractive and predictable option for corporates.

A more proactive enforcement approach

A central theme of the speech was the SFO’s intention to move away from a reactive, referral-based model towards a more proactive approach to enforcement.

Intelligence and surveillance

Backed by significant government investment, the SFO is developing an enterprise intelligence system to aggregate data from multiple sources, which, alongside a new case management system, will make it easier to identify threats by linking information across cases.

The SFO is therefore seeking to generate its own pipeline of cases, rather than relying on external referrals. As Mr McNulty observed, “not self-reporting is a gamble and the odds are getting worse.”

He also confirmed that steps are being taken to enable the more efficient use of surveillance powers in live investigations. This reflects a broader shift towards a more assertive investigative posture, particularly in relation to complex economic crime.

For corporates, these developments increase the likelihood that potential misconduct will come to the SFO’s attention independently of any self-report.

Whistleblowers

Nr McNulty highlighted that UK nationals are the second largest users of US whistleblower incentivisation programmes, with over 700 individuals providing intelligence between 2012 and 2023. He described this as a “significant intelligence outflow from the UK”.

He confirmed that whistleblowers are a critical source of intelligence and reiterated his support for the introduction of a domestic incentivisation scheme, with the second part of the Fisher Review expected to address this issue later this year.

If implemented, such a scheme would be likely to increase materially the volume of intelligence available to the SFO and the likelihood that internal issues are reported externally at an early stage.

Expanded powers under ECCTA

The failure to prevent fraud offence, which came into force in September 2025, has broad territorial scope, applying to conduct anywhere in the world where there is a UK nexus. Mr McNulty confirmed that the SFO intends to make full use of the offence, both as a basis for prosecution and as a means of driving improvements in corporate behaviour.

In addition, ECCTA’s expansion of the SFO’s investigatory powers has introduced the ability for the SFO to compel the production of documents before a formal investigation is opened across a wider range of economic crimes. This is complemented by the increasing use of Criminal Overseas Production Orders to obtain electronic data held overseas. Taken together, these measures materially enhance the SFO’s ability to obtain evidence at an early stage. 

International co-operation

Mr McNulty noted that the SFO’s France/Switzerland Prosecutorial Taskforce has evolved beyond case-by-case collaboration to a more integrated model, enabling closer operational alignment between agencies. He cited the AOG Technics investigation, which resulted in a conviction in late 2025 following a successful Joint Investigation Team agreement with Portuguese authorities as an example of this approach in practice.

He also highlighted the SFO’s close relationship with the US Department of Justice, noting that the SFO is actively seeking to pursue, in coordination with US authorities, cases with a UK nexus that fall outside US enforcement priorities.

Comment

The speech indicates a desire by the SFO to expand its investigative reach and make more assertive use of available enforcement tools. 

While the revised co-operation guidance is intended to offer increased certainty for corporates that self-report and co-operate fully, it remains to be seen whether it is viewed as sufficient incentive to materially increase the instances of self-report.  In particular, it is unclear whether the stated timelines can consistently be achieved in complex cases, and of course no time frame is given for the SFO’s substantive investigation beyond an expectation that this should be “reasonably prompt”. Such period is likely, based upon previous cases, to be lengthy.

At the same time, enhanced intelligence capabilities, expanded statutory powers and the potential introduction of a domestic whistleblower incentivisation regime may increase the risk that misconduct comes to the SFO’s attention through other routes, and will need to be weighed carefully as part of any self-reporting decision.

Ultimately, the SFO’s aim must be to provide a meaningful “stick”; by demonstrating it can independently identify and prosecute wrongdoing, alongside the “carrot” of co-operation credit and the offer of a DPA.