Setting aside awards: new guidance from the Singapore court

1. overview

The Singapore High Court's recent decision in DLS v DLT [2025] SGHC 61 offers important practical guidance on three issues which often arise in international arbitration:

• the distinction between interim measures and partial awards — and why that distinction matters;
• whether new grounds for setting aside an award can be introduced outside the three-month statutory deadline; and
• how courts assess apparent bias based on an arbitrator’s failure to disclose potential conflicts.

This article discusses the Court's findings and highlights practical takeaways which companies may consider, alongside their legal counsel, when determining arbitration strategies and to ensure that they mitigate risks effectively.

2. Factual Background

In DLS v DLT, the parties — main Contractor and Sub-Contractor — were engaged in a construction dispute seated in Singapore under the 2021 International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Arbitration (the "ICC Rules").

The Sub-Contractor applied for "urgent interim measures", which led to the arbitral tribunal granting the following relief:

• A Payment Order requiring the Contractor to pay US$172,135.54 monthly to the Sub-Contractor to cover the Sub-Contractor's operational costs until final completion ("Monthly Payment Decision").
• A Payment Order requiring a one-off lump sum payment of US$117,339.48, representing VAT refunds owed ("Lump Sum Payment Decision").

These two decisions were issued as part of the tribunal's "First Partial Award", a label that would later become central to the dispute. The award was dated 19 June 2024 and subsequently corrected on 9 October 2024. On 13 November 2024, the Contractor applied to the Singapore court to set aside the two decisions above ("Set Aside Application").

The Contractor later sought to add a further ground — apparent bias — on 5 February 2025, based on an arbitrator’s non-disclosure of a prior appointment.

In DLS v DLT, the Court considered the Set Aside Application and whether apparent bias could be allowed as a new ground for the Set Aside Application.  

3. The COurt's Findings and Key Takeaways

    (A) Form vs substance: Is a decision an "award" or an "interim measure"?

Before deciding whether the tribunal's decisions could be set aside, the Court first considered a threshold question: were the tribunal's decisions "awards" under section 2 of the International Arbitration Act 1994 ("IAA"), or interim orders under section 12 of the IAA?

This distinction is critical. Only an "award" can be set aside (i.e. challenged under section 24 of the IAA or Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, read with section 3 of the IAA). Interim orders, even if financially significant, are not susceptible to setting aside.

The Court reaffirmed that whether a decision is labelled as an "award" or "order" is not determinative of its legal effect. Similarly, the fact that a decision is made pursuant to an "interim measures" application does not preclude it from being an "award".

Instead, the Court will consider substance over form: Is the decision provisional or final? Specifically, does it "definitively or finally dispose of a claim or issue" and is it "inherently capable of being varied"?

The Court found that the Monthly Payment Decision was an interim order under section 12 of the IAA, because it was explicitly subject to review in the final award and required the Sub-Contractor to provide security "in the event that repayment is subsequently ordered".

In contrast, the Lump Sum Payment Decision was found to be an award — the tribunal determined the sum was "owing and due" with no further conditions. It was therefore capable of being set aside (albeit the Court ultimately rejected all grounds raised).

Practical takeaway: Companies involved in disputes, and their appointed legal counsel, should ensure that the relief sought in any interim applications is carefully formulated, since the nature of the relief granted determines whether it can later be challenged. Interim measures may be shielded from challenge regardless of their potentially significant financial impact.

     (B) Time limit for new setting aside grounds: Can new grounds be introduced for set aside applications after the three-month deadline?

The short answer: Yes — but only with the Court’s permission, and only in limited circumstances.

The Court confirmed that while a party must file a setting aside application within the three-month period prescribed under Article 34(3) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, it may, subject to the Court's discretion, file a supplementary affidavit introducing new grounds (e.g., apparent bias), provided the initial application was filed in time. In the present case, the Court found the Set Aside Application, filed on 13 November 2024, was within three months from the date of the corrected award (9 October 2024).

In exercising this discretion, the Court considered whether:

• the facts giving rise to the new ground could and ought to have been raised earlier; and
• the new ground was hopeless.

In this case, the Contractor’s bias argument arose from facts it learned only after filing its initial application and supporting affidavits. The Court held that the Contractor was not precluded from seeking permission to introduce apparent bias as a new basis for setting aside after the three-month period for applications to set aside awards had passed. This is because the Court construed the late application as an expansion of an existing, valid one, rather than a new application.

Ultimately, the Court found that the new ground was hopeless (discussed below), and the Contractor's original grounds for setting aside (regarding (1) the scope of submission to arbitration, and (2) an alleged breach of natural justice) also failed, leading to the dismissal of the Set Aside Application.

Notably, the Court also clarified that, notwithstanding the ICC Court had already rejected the Contractor's apparent bias challenge, this did not prevent the Contractor from seeking to set aside aspects of the First Partial Award on the basis of apparent bias before the Singapore Courts.

Practical takeaway: If parties become aware of potential bias or misconduct allegations, timing is key. Late discovery of relevant facts does not automatically bar relief — but parties (and their legal advisors) must act promptly once new evidence emerges.

    (C) Apparent bias based on arbitrator non-disclosure: What is the standard of the duty of disclosure for arbitrators?

In rejecting the Contractor’s challenge for apparent bias, the Court reaffirmed the Singapore test for disqualification: whether there are circumstances that would give rise to a reasonable apprehension in a fair-minded observer with knowledge of the facts that the tribunal may be biased and that a fair hearing may not be possible (BYL v BYN [2020] 4 SLR 1).

The challenge centred on the arbitrator's non-disclosure of a prior appointment in an unrelated arbitration in which the Sub-Contractor's chairman (in his personal capacity) was a claimant. The Court emphasised that non-disclosure is not a standalone ground for disqualification — the real question is whether it gives rise to apparent bias, even if the omission was deliberate. That said, non-disclosure remains a relevant factor in assessing bias.

The Court considered (1) whether the subject arbitrator knew, earlier than he claimed, that the claimants in the two arbitrations were related, and (2) the arbitrator's reasons for non-disclosure.

The Court held that the arbitrator did not know about the connection at the time he submitted his Statement of Acceptance to the ICC. The Court also considered whether the arbitrator "ought to have known". In this regard, the Court agreed with the ICC Court's prior finding that the arbitrator had "acted reasonably when making inquiries prior to signing his Statement of Acceptance".

Notably, the Court considered the interplay between the ICC Rules and the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration. Whilst the IBA Guidelines serve only as guidelines, the Court noted that they are referred to in the ICC Handbook and have been judicially commended.

The Court observed that the ICC Rules apply a subjective standard ("in the eyes of the parties") to independence and an objective standard to impartiality. In contrast, General Standard 3 of the IBA Guidelines applies a subjective test to both, potentially requiring more expansive disclosure. That said, the previous appointment here, which happened more than four years prior, did not fall within the Orange List so, even under the IBA Guidelines, disclosure was not strictly necessary.

As to the arbitrator's reasons for non-disclosure, the Court noted he had first assessed — reasonably — that disclosure was unnecessary due to the four-year time gap and lack of overlap in issues or subject matter of the current case and of the prior appointment. Only thereafter did he consider that disclosure might trigger a challenge to his impartiality — a factor that should not have influenced the arbitrator's decision not to disclose, but ultimately was not determinative for the Court to find apparent bias. The Court reiterated, citing BYL v BYN, that even deliberate non-disclosure to avoid challenge does not necessarily indicate bias.

Ultimately, the Court found no apparent bias: the prior appointment was distant in time, the arbitrator acted in good faith, and there was no pattern of repeat appointments or financial dependence. The Contractor’s application to add the bias ground was dismissed, and even if allowed, the Court held that the challenge would have failed.

Practical takeaway: It is incumbent on all parties engaged in a dispute, including the parties, arbitrators and legal counsel, to undertake conflict checks in accordance with the applicable laws and arbitration rules and, typically, the IBA Guidelines. Notably, the 2024 IBA Guidelines now impose a duty on parties to make reasonable enquiries to identify potential conflicts both at the outset and during proceedings (General Standard 4).

Comment

On 21 March 2025, the Singapore Ministry of Law announced that it has commissioned the Singapore International Dispute Resolution Academy (SIDRA) to conduct a study on the international arbitration regime in Singapore and the IAA. Members of the public have been invited to provide views on eight issues, including whether separate cost principles should be applied in respect of unsuccessful setting aside applications, and whether the time limit to file a setting aside application should be reduced. For more information, see here.