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This article explores the evolving legal and regulatory landscape for CAVs in Australia, with a focus on privacy, cyber security and the implications of forthcoming reforms such as the Automated Vehicle Safety Law (AVSL).
This article forms part of our global series on CAVs – explore our other articles here.
Key takeaways
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CAVs capture a wide range of data which, depending on the context of data collection (including whether an individual is identifiable in respect of the information), may include personal information. For example, this can arise in the context of:
This can raise questions under privacy laws, particularly where such data may be used to identify, profile or monitor individuals. This was highlighted at the ‘UNSW Privacy & Security Regulation for Connected Cars Workshop’ on 2 May 2025, where Australia’s Privacy Commissioner signalled a regulatory focus on data collection / use practices in the CAV context. In particular, the Privacy Commissioner expressed concerns with lack of transparency and consumer awareness of CAV data collection practices and the resulting power asymmetry.
The Privacy Commissioner identified a number of key issues, including:
CAV providers should take stock of what (if any) personal information is collected, used or disclosed and ensure that appropriate notices, consents and other practices and procedures are in place to meet privacy law requirements. Similarly, CAV providers should consider if automated decision-making (ADM) involving personal information is used in their CAVs and, if so, determine if such use will be subject to the new ADM requirements under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (Privacy Act) and in Western Australia, the Privacy and Responsible Information Sharing Act 2024 (WA)2. Breach of privacy laws can attract various consequences, including potentially significant penalties, injunctions and enforceable undertakings.
Class actions relating to disclosure of driving data for insurance purposesThere has been an increase in alleged privacy and/or security breaches in respect of connected cars in the US:
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In addition to the privacy risks outline above, there are various state-based laws regulating the use of surveillance devices in Australia, and what can be done with information gathered with those devices. The requirements (for example, notice and consent) vary across jurisdictions and may apply to location, video, audio and data surveillance.
In addition to these general surveillance device laws, ACT and NSW also specifically regulate surveillance in an employment context. With non-CAVs, these requirements have been particularly relevant to employers in the context of surveillance of their staff drivers. With CAVs, the impact of these laws will depend on the extent to which staff are (assisted) drivers, or passengers, of the vehicles.
CAV providers, as well as employers providing or requiring use of CAVs, should ensure they are across the relevant requirements in each state.
To the extent data breaches involve personal information, under the Privacy Act’s notifiable data breaches scheme, entities regulated by the Act are required to notify the OAIC (and affected individuals) in the event of an ‘eligible data breach’, defined to occur when:
Penalties for breach of the Privacy Act can be significant, with the maximum penalty for a serious or repeated interference with privacy being the greater of:
On 8 October 2025, the Federal Court ordered the first civil penalty ($5.8 million) under the Privacy Act (refer to our article here for further details). This demonstrates the willingness of regulators to enforce penalties for significant interferences with privacy.
CAVs may become targets for cyberattacks, gven their increasingly central role in transport infrastructure and the amounts of valuable and sensitive data they handle.
The Cyber Security Act 2024 (Cth) and the Cyber Security (Security Standards for Smart Devices) Rules 2025 (Rules) set out core cyber security obligations applicable to manufacturers and suppliers of certain smart devices. While the Rules exclude road vehicles and road vehicle components as defined in the Road Vehicle Standards Act 2018 (Cth) (RVSA), there is some uncertainty regarding the application of these exclusions to CAVs. At present, connectivity features of CAVs do not fall within the definition of ‘road vehicle component’ for the purposes of exemption under the Rules.5
The Critical Infrastructure Security Centre has also signalled that new standards for cyber security of road vehicles could be introduced under the Cyber Security Act 2024 (Cth) where existing requirements under the RVSA are insufficient.6
Jeep Cherokee hack The Jeep Cherokee hacking incident was a widely publicised 2015 cyber security demonstration in which ‘white hat’ security researchers remotely accessed and took control of a Jeep Cherokee’s critical functions, including steering, brakes, and transmission via its internet-connected entertainment system. The researchers exploited vulnerabilities in the vehicle’s system, allowing them to send commands over the internet to the car’s internal network. This high-profile hack highlighted the real-world risks of connected vehicle technology, prompting industry-wide attention to automotive cyber security. Subaru Starlink hack (2025) Earlier this year, 'ethical' hacker Sam Curry detailed how he and his colleague discovered a vulnerability in Subaru’s Starlink multimedia technology that could potentially allow a third party to access Starlink accounts. With this access, they were able to gather real-time data about the vehicle’s location, operate door locks and start or stop an engine. Similarly, vehicle location history over the previous 12 months, physical addresses and the last four digits of credit cards used with the account were able to be retrieved. In response, Subaru patched the vulnerability within 24 hours of the hack. However, the issue raises wider concerns for CAV manufacturers to consider security-by-design at the outset. |
While CAV-specific cyber security standards may take some time to be developed, CAV providers should benchmark existing cyber controls against the Australian Cyber Security Centre’s ‘Essential Eight’ cyber threat mitigation strategies (which is now the minimum standard across organisations).
CAV providers may offer telematics solutions to consumers, collecting and interpreting vehicle data for various purposes (including for fleet management, predictive maintenance, insurance assessments, etc). Data from CAVs is also often shared between with manufacturers, service providers and other entities.
The telematics solution or aspects of data handling process may be outsourced to third party service providers. Where that is the case, CAV providers should ensure that robust contractual safeguards are in place in respect of the relevant data. The contractual regimes should cover regulatory and security requirements, as well as having broader regard to commercial considerations and scope of data use rights.
The National Transport Commission (NTC) and the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts have been working to create a set of rules for automated vehicle safety, following public consultation which ended in 2024. The NTC is currently analysing this feedback and, as at November 2025, no further update on the timeframe for the possible AVSL has been provided.
The AVSL consultation paper highlighted the challenges and risks posed by remote operation of vehicles, particularly in the context of cyber security management and secure transmission of data.
Amongst other things, the proposed rules (if adopted) would introduce information management obligations in respect of certain information, including details about modifications and data required to support incident investigations. Additionally, the proposed rules seek to establish a new in-service safety regulator to support and enforce the AVSL.
As the legal and regulatory landscape for CAVs continues to evolve, CAV providers should take proactive steps to manage risk and ensure compliance across privacy, cyber security and data governance. In addition to monitoring regulatory reforms on the horizon (in particular, in respect of the Privacy Act and the AVSL), this should include:
Partner, Melbourne
Partner, Head of Technology, Media and Telecommunications Sector, Sydney
Partner, Head of Technology, Media and Telecommunications, Asia and Australia, Brisbane and Africa Group
Special Counsel, Melbourne
Executive Counsel, Melbourne
The contents of this publication are for reference purposes only and may not be current as at the date of accessing this publication. They do not constitute legal advice and should not be relied upon as such. Specific legal advice about your specific circumstances should always be sought separately before taking any action based on this publication.
© Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer 2026
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